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Executive Summary
The traditional argument that shorter product cycles favor trade secrets over
patenting is based on the presumption that copying becomes less profitable
and trade secrets less likely to be discovered when a technology can be used
for a shortened time period only. I review this argument. Under certain
circumstances shorter product cycles can generate incentives to apply for
more patents and the consequence may be the emergence of a patent thicket.
In the model the underlying mechanism for the more intensive patenting
activity is that one firm may start to raise its number of patent applications
for exogenous reasons and the optimal reaction of other firms is then to match
this behavior. Otherwise, the extensive patenting of one firm would drive the
other firms out of the market or cut their profits significantly. In order to
prevent this, the other firms start filing patent applications on many ideas,
which are not mature yet but may turn out successful eventually, instead
of few fully developed technologies. If this situation occurs the firms may
end up in a prisoners’ dilemma where they would jointly prefer the situation
where all firms innovate at moderate pace but each individual firm has an
incentive to deviate to a short cycle with intensive patenting.
Further, network effects may reinforce a firm’s incentive to accelerate
her R&D process and to induce other firms to adopt this strategy. Network
effects make it more attractive to gain market shares at an early stage because
an advance compared to the competitors will be persistent. Therefore, the
model predicts an intensive race by means of patent applications followed by a
period of attenuated innovative activities. Similarly, blocking patents provide
an advantage over competitors by limiting their access to technologies. But,
in contrast to network effects, this is socially harmful because some R&D
effort is wasted. Therefore, firms will patent less because their R&D tends
to be less efficient.
Licensing is an appropriate remedy to blocking patents and patent thick-
ets and policy should facilitate licensing agreements in order to benefit from
technologies that would otherwise lie idle.
Zusammenfassung
Das Argument, ku¨rzere Produktlebenszyklen wu¨rden zu einem versta¨rkten
Einsatz von Geheimhaltung statt Patentierens fu¨hren, basiert auf dem Ef-
fekt, dass Nachahmen weniger lohnend und Geheimhaltung effektiver werden.
Die U¨berpru¨fung dieses Arguments zeigt, dass unter bestimmten Bedingun-
gen der gegenteilige Effekt eintreten kann. Verku¨rzte Produktlebenszyklen
ko¨nnen dazu fu¨hren, dass vermehrt Patentanmeldungen eingereicht werden.
In der Folge ist es wahrscheinlicher, dass Patentdickichte entstehen.
Im Modell bewirkt das versta¨rkte Patentieren durch ein Unternehmen,
dass andere Unternehmen gezwungen werden, dieses Verhalten nachzuahmen.
Andernfalls wu¨rden sie den Zugriff auf neue Technologien verlieren oder zu-
mindest starke Gewinneinbußen erleiden. Um dies zu verhindern, beginnen
auch die anderen Unternehmen zahlreiche, noch nicht ausgereifte Ideen, die
sich erst spa¨ter als erfolgreich herausstellen ko¨nnen, zum Patent anzumelden,
statt nur wenige, ausgereifte Technologien anzumelden. Wenn diese Situation
eintritt, befinden sich die Unternehmen in einem Gefangenendilemma: Jedes
von ihnen bevorzugt die Situation, in der alle moderat patentieren. Wenn
alle Unternehmen diese Strategie verfolgen hat jedes Unternehmen einen in-
dividuellen Anreiz doch wieder versta¨rkt zu patentieren.
Das Vorliegen von Netzwerkeffekten versta¨rkt den Anreiz fu¨r jedes Un-
ternehmen seine F&E-Intensita¨t zu erho¨hen. Dieser Effekt bewirkt, dass es
fu¨r Unternehmen besonders profitabel ist, fru¨hzeitig Marktanteile zu erlan-
gen, weil sein gro¨ßerer Marktanteil ein Unternehmen besonders attraktiv fu¨r
neue Kunden macht. Deshalb sagt das Modell fu¨r solche Industrien einen
anfangs versta¨rkten, spa¨ter nachlassenden Technologiewettbewerb voraus.
In gleicher Weise bewirken blockierende Patente, dass ihre Inhaber einen
Vorteil gegenu¨ber Wettbewerbern erlangen. Dies sind Patente, die fu¨r eine
bestimmte Technologie essenziell sind. Im Gegensatz zu Netzwerkeffekten
beruht die Wirkung von blockierenden Patenten darauf, dass F&E Aufwen-
dungen obsolet werden. Daher reduziert sich der Anreiz von Unternehmen
zu patentieren, weil F&E-Investitionen weniger produktiv werden.
Lizenzen sind ein wirksames Instrument, um Patentdickichte und die
blockierende Wirkung von Patenten aufzulo¨sen. Solche Vereinbarungen zwis-
chen Unternehmen sollten vereinfacht werden, damit Technologien, die nur
aufgrund von Patentdickichten brach liegen, eingesetzt werden ko¨nnen.
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Abstract
The traditional argument that shorter product cycles favor trade
secret over patenting is reviewed. A game theoretic model provides
an argument that shorter product cycles can induce firms to file more
patent applications. The firms may be trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma
where all firms would jointly prefer to patent less and to not have a
patent thicket. If firms start applying for patents on technologies
which are not yet mature in order to cover ideas that may eventually
turn successful, this may create a patent thicket. The transition into
a situation where firms start patenting many ideas instead of single
mature technologies is initiated and accelerated when network effects
are present or patents exhibit a blocking property.
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21 Introduction
Where does the patent thicket come from? Some industries tend to produce
patent applications which result in overlapping property rights, for example
the ICT sector, biotechnologies or the software industry.1 Using one’s own
patents may inevitably infringe upon other parties’ patents. Thus, patents
can be used in order to block others from exploiting their patents or hin-
der them to develop competing products based on their own patents.2 In
less severe cases the fragmentation of intellectual property rights leads to a
cost rise for developing marketable products. Overall, this may result in an
disincentive for innovation.3
There are several explanations for the emergence of patent thickets4 and
the so-called patent surge or patent explosion5. The present paper conjectures
that a shorter product cycle can induce a higher propensity to patent. This
contrasts with the intuition that a shorter time for recouping the investment
for a technology renders secrecy more attractive than patenting, thus the
shortening of product cycles is contented to reduce the propensity to patent.
Sabety (2004) provides an exemplary comparison of the information tech-
nology industry, where software was originally considered not patetentable
subject mater, whereas in nanotechnology patentability has never been ques-
tioned. In both industries patent thickets are emerging and this hampers
or delays further innovation, but nanotechnology is a comparatively juve-
nile industry. In order to allow this industry to live a long period of jaunty
development as did the software industry before, he recommends to adopt
a similar IP schedule where the strength of IP protection should raise with
1See Shapiro (2001), Sabety (2004).
2See Heller and Eisenberg (1998).
3See Merges and Nelson (1990).
4A detailed discussion is provided for example by Shapiro (2001).
5See Kortum and Lerner (1998) or Sanyal and Jaffee (2007).
3maturity of the industry in order to avoid blocking situations in the early
stage.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next subsections
will provide reference to related work and present the intuition for the model
setting. Section 2 sets up the model, which is discussed in section 3. Section
4 provides extensions on network effects, blocking patents, and licensing.
Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Related Work
There is a strand of literature on sequential improvements of products. A
detailed discussion of IP policy in the context of quality ladders is provided
by Scotchmer (2004). The firm strategies on sequential innovations and the
aﬄicting factors on the decision to introduce incremental innovations or fron-
tier innovations are analyzed by Gjerde et al. (2002).
Another strand of literature on product cycles and international trade
is based on heterogeneous firms. Models with a high ability to innovate in
the North region face imitators or a less productive South region. Based
on this idea by Vernon (1966) several refinements of this model confirm the
robustness of his result that the firm (country) endowed with a technologi-
cal advance keeps this advantage. Segerstrom et al. (1990) find that trade
tariffs that protect from the imitating country’s lower labor cost reduce over-
all the innovative activity in an economy. Similarly, extending the present
model by blocking patents results in the effect that R&D activities become
less productive and, thus, less attractive to firms. Grossman and Helpman
(1991) analyze heterogenous countries in a general equilibrium model. The
countries differ in their ability to innovate and they can imitate or innovate
and this determines endogenously the product cycle. They study how the
4sizes of the two regions and the levels of support or subsidies for R&D affect
the long-run rates of innovation and imitation and, finally, how this aﬄicts
the length of the average product cycle. I will adopt from their setting that
the innovator earns the monopoly payoff and that the R&D decision is to be
taken repeatedly. However, in contrast to their model with asymmetric coun-
tries, I focus on symmetric firms because this paper aims at analyzing the
patenting strategies of firms on a level playing field. This is a presumption in
part of the literature on endogenous growth, e.g. Aghion and Howitt (1992),
where the research question aims at an optimal policy for aggregate produc-
tion or knowledge growth. However, I consider the interaction among R&D
conducting firms whereas that strand of literature stylizes this interaction as
spillovers.
The timing of introducing new products with consideration of the trade-
off between time to market, resources spent, and the degree of novelty has
been inter alia analyzed by Reinganum (1989), Fudenberg and Tirole (1984),
Tirole (1990) and Hendricks (1992). Similarly, concentrating on the adoption
of single innovations, the present model builds on these insights and focuses
on the use of patent applications as an instrument to pursue these strategies.
A model allowing for incremental innovations as well as frontier innovations
is provided by Gjerde et al. (2002).
1.2 The Story
I analyze the firms’ incentive to patent as a reaction to their competitors’
patenting strategies. Thereby, patenting is an instrument to support an
accelerated R&D process and to induce a shortening of product life cycles.
Products are regularly modified and updated to meet the current con-
sumers’ expectations, regulatory norms, or state of the art. In the automobil
5industry model years show up minor modifications up to a change in the
model cycle where a new body or a new series of engines is built in. Similarly,
computers, i.e. the CPU, have shown a typical evolvement in performance
and the generations of CPU have been named i86 and Pentium, Pentium2,
Pentium3, ...6 Further, we observe that product life cycles tend to become
shorter.7 One reason in the automotive sector is that the design is done with
more advanced software and many time-consuming processes were replaced
or accelerated by use of computers. Other reasons are that both the produc-
tion and development processes have been reorganized, such that the role of
IP became more important.8 Whimsical observers of the market proclaim
that the test phase for new vehicles has been shifted to the early buyers,
leading to a surge in lemon cars.
In the present analysis, I focus on products where patent protection is
immanent. This means that any innovation is patented because it may be
too easy to copy, e.g. by reverse engineering. Thus, I do not focus on the
trade-off between secrecy and protection. This would attack on a distinct
branch of literature which has been analyzed to a broad extent (See Cohen,
Nelson, and Walsh (2000), Gallini (2002)).
As in Ofek and Savary (2004), I model a very stylized demand behavior
of the consumers who strictly prefer a new generation product as soon as
this becomes available. A firm that offers a predecessor model will make no
sales. This extreme demand structure is primarily helpful for the handling
of the model structure. In fact, there exists evidence that firms have to offer
extensive discounts to sell new products stemming from an outdated product
life cycle. In the automotive industry passed year models are sold with high
6See Ofek and Sarvary (2003).
7See Agarwal and Gort (2001).
8See Teece et al. (1997), Pisano and Teece (2007).
6rebates as soon as the next model year becomes available.9 This stylized
distribution of demand can be derived from individual utility maximizing
behavior, e.g. in Shaked and Sutton (1982) or Mussa and Rosen (1978)
where ex ante symmetric firms offer vertically differentiated products. Each
firm prefers to offer the higher quality product and these two models do not
explain which firms takes which role.
For the R&D process I assume that firms have a number of ideas on how
to develop a technology and that finding the appropriate technology is a
time-consuming process. At the patenting stage, a firm may not yet know
which of its ideas will turn out to be valuable and will lead to a marketable
product. Thus, finally one out of many ideas turns out to be the basis of a
new technology and will be developed, which then will be patented. Real-
izing these steps one by one will take time that delays the marketing of the
new product. However, each of these steps is essential and cannot be circum-
vented. But the process can be accelerated if a firm is applying for patents
on many promising technologies before she finds out which actually is the
successful technology. Thus, more than the successful idea is patented. This
strategy allows to protect potentially tractable technologies before the final
decision is taken on which one is to be carried out up to the final product.
Advocates of patent continuations contend that defining an invention is a
complex process and it may become necessary to amend the scope of protec-
tion that is claimed in the original application. This practice is common at
the USPTO but continuing patent applications are not admissible the EPO.
Still, firms can file many applications.10
I will distinguish a long and a short R&D schedule L and S, respectively.
In the long schedule the firms first develop an idea into a technology, which
is patented subsequently. In contrast in the short schedule several ideas are
9See Langer and Miller (2008).
10See Katznelson (2007).
7patented before the successful idea has been identified. Thus, the final tech-
nology is based on a patented idea and the protection of other ideas becomes
obsolete even though these ideas eventually are granted patent protection.
These patents together with countless pending patent applications may over
time create a patent thicket with overlapping intellectual property rights and
create uncertainty.11 Sometimes continuations with amended sham claims
are filed in order to cover a competitor’s product.12 This procedure is not
covered by the Patent Examining Procudure, although it can occur.13
In our model each of the two schedules will have pros and cons. Basically,
the short cycle offers the chance to market a new product cycle earlier than
under the long cycle. However, there is a higher cost because more patent
applications are filed. Also R&D may be conducted more intensively or the
search of prior art must be conducted more accurately because this informa-
tion must be available earlier than the accomplishment of the patent search
report. In contrast, the long cycle has fewer costs and upon completion the
R&D process provides a certain success, i.e. the firm will dispose of a viable
technology.
R&D is an ongoing process. This means that within a product life cycle,
the R&D process for the next generation product may already start. In our
model I may have an overlap of product cycles in the sense that one product
is in the R&D stage while the previous generation is on the market. Further,
as R&D is uncertain, for a certain period it may be not clear which product
is marketed. If the R&D process is successful, the new generation will be
offered, otherwise it is the old product. In case that a firm has applied for
patents on many technology ideas before having developed them to a mature
11See Blonder (2005).
12See Katznelson (2007).
13See §201.07, Manual of Patent Examining Procedures, USPTO, (August 2006), at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep.htm.
8technology, it can be lucky and be able to transform one of them into a
product that is sold immediately. Then, the competitor is no more able to
sell her product, unless she can also offer a new generation product.
2 The Model
In this section I present the basic model which is solved by backwards induc-
tion. This model will be extended in the subsequent section.
Assume that in a long R&D process the final product is marketed in the
period following the R&D stage. This means that in the long R&D process
the firm will have a product in the second period for sure but none during the
R&D stage. In the first stage R&D is conducted and in the second period and
possibly in the third period the product is marketed. In this example stage
two is a pure marketing stage whereas stage three consists of both selling the
product and conducting R&D for the next generation product. Thus, a cycle
lasts for two periods until R&D is conducted anew. I denote this strategy of
firm i by L2i where the superscript denotes the number of periods until R&D
starts anew. I normalize the cost of this long R&D process to zero.
A firm can choose the length of its product cycle, i.e. when it starts the
R&D process anew. A short R&D process aims at introducing a new product
in the same period in which the R&D is conducted. Being successful the new
product is marketed in the first stage, otherwise in the second. If a firm
conducts R&D in each period and aims at offering a new generation product
in each period, this cycle lasts only one period. The costs of the short R&D
strategy is proportional to the number of patent applications N(p) where p
is the probability that the firm will have a successful technology in the R&D
period. Such a short R&D strategy combined with a short cycle by firm i is
denoted S1i .
9The payoffs will depend on the strategy choices of the two firms. In order
to take into account time, I discount with the factor 0 < δ < 1 per period.
By assumption, all periods are of identical length. The simplest case arises
when the firms choose symmetric strategies. If both firms choose L2i , this
variable will also denote the payoff
L21,2 = pi
D + δpiD + δ2L21,2
L21,2 =
piD
1− δ .(1)
Basically, both firms offer identical products which are updated every other
period. Consequently, they earn duopoly profit piD in every period.
Similarly, if both firms apply strategy S1i they have identical expectations
about each future period. However, as the R&D processes are uncertain, the
payoffs will depend on the R&D outcomes. Either both firms, one, or none
of them may be successful. If only one of the firms is successful we have the
asymmetric case where the innovator will earn monopoly profits because by
assumption only his product will meet demand like in Grossman and Helpman
(1991). In the symmetric case, both firms choose the same strategy.
The success probability of a firm will depend on the number of its patent
applications. Let pi denote the success probability of firm i in the R&D stage.
Then N(pi) is the number of patent applications that are necessary in order
to realize this probability. N can be interpreted as the cost of patenting if
the cost of one patent application is normalized to one. In order to guarantee
that pi ∈ [0; 1], I assume N being convex, N(0) = 0, limp→1N(p) = ∞. If
the firms do not apply the short R&D cycle or they are not successful in the
short cycle, I assume that the firms obtain the relevant technology for sure
in the subsequent period at zero cost. This normalization will simplify the
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further computations. The expected payoff for firm 1 will be
S11 = −N(p1) + p1(1− p2)piM + (1− p1)(1− p2)piD + p1p2piD + δS11
S11 =
−N(p1) + p1(1− p2)piM + (1− p1)(1− p2)piD + p1p2piD
1− δ .(2)
p1(1 − p2) is the probability of the case where firm 1 is successful, but firm
2 is not. In the opposite case, firm 1 earns zero profit. (1 − p1)(1 − p2) is
the probability that both firms take their augmented effort in vain. Still they
earn duopoly profits because in the period after the previous R&D stage both
are certain to have a (pre-generation) product and earn duopoly profit. p1p2
is the probability that both firms successfully introduce a new product. For
simplicity reasons I assume that the duopoly profit is the same as with the
old product.
In the case that the firms have asymmetric strategies, I need further as-
sumptions. Departing from an L21,2 situation, assume that firm 1 chooses to
switch to an S1 strategy. If it finds it profitable in one period, it will be prof-
itable in the next period, too, given that the competitor is still following an
L22 strategy. Thus, firm 1 would shorten his product cycle and the only sen-
sible strategy would be S11 . Consequently, I need to consider an appropriate
reaction of firm 2. If for firm 2 sticking to the L22 strategy is still profitable,
then she continues to have zero R&D costs but she yields a positive revenue
only with probability 1 − p1, when firm 1 is not successful. However, after
having faced her competitor shortening his R&D process firm 2 can switch to
an S2 strategy, too. For the same argument as above, if switching once to an
S2 strategy, when firm 1 follows an S
1
1 strategy, is profitable, it will be so in
the next period, too, such that firm 2 would choose S22 . Summing up, either
firm 2 reacts by adopting the same strategy as firm 1 or she does not change
her behavior. Now, I can formulate the two payoffs. Let firm 1 choose S11
11
while firm 2 sticks to the long research cycle with L12. The payoff is
S11(L
1
2) = −N(p1) + p1piM + (1− p1)piD.(3)
For firm 2 it is
L22(S
1
1) = (1− p1)piD.(4)
i = 2
i = 1 L12, L
2
2 S
2
2
L11, L
2
1 pi
D (1−p2)piD
piD −N(p2)+p2piM+(1−p2)piD
S11 −N(p1)+p1piM+(1−p1)piD −N(p1)+p1(1−p2)piM+(1−p1)(1−p2)piD+p1p2piD
(1−p1)piD −N(p2)+p2(1−p1)piM+(1−p2)(1−p1)piD+p1p2piD
Table 1: Payoff matrix
In the following I will use the notation Πi(x1, x2) for firm i’s strategy with
xi ∈ {L;S} denoting i’s strategy.
2.1 Equilibria in the static game
This subsection covers the strategy choice of the firms with respect to the
length of the cycles. Depending on the magnitude of the payoffs, all combi-
nations of actions can form an equilibrium.
It is not clear whether an S strategy is profitable overall. But, comparing
the payoffs immediately shows that being the only firm to follow an S strategy
is more profitable than if both firms do so. We can immediately see that
−N(p1) + p1(1− p2)piM + (1− p1)(1− p2)piD + p1p2piD > piD ⇔
−N(p1) + p1piM + (1− p1)piD − p1p2(piM − piD)− (1− p2)piD > piD
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implies
−N(p˜1) + p˜1piM + (1− p˜1)piD > piD(5)
where N(p1) and N(p˜1) denote the number of patent applications in the sym-
metric S;S and asymmetric S;L strategy choice, respectively. This means
that if it is more profitable for both firms to choose the short cycle than both
sticking to the long cycle, then each firm would prefer to be the only firm
with the short cycle while the other stays with the long cycle.
However, whether an S strategy is profitable overall, depends on the
parameters, namely the success probabilities, the monopoly and duopoly
payoffs, and the cost of R&D. It is obvious that high costs of research or
low monopoly payoffs will result in an L;L equilibrium. Conversely, if the
prospective monopoly profit is high compared to the R&D costs, then both
firms may be willing to take a chance and both choose the short cycle S.
Lemma 1 A firm unilaterally choosing the short cycle S applies for more
patents than in the symmetric case where both firms choose S: N(p˜1) >
N(p1).
Proof Firm 1’s payoff and the first order condition for S;L are
−N(p˜1) + p˜1piM + (1− p˜1)piD(6)
N ′(p˜1) = piM − piD.(7)
In the symmetric case S;S the payoff and the first order conditions are
−N(p1) + p1(1− p2)piM + [(1− p1)(1− p2) + p1p2]piD(8)
N ′(p1) = piM − piD − p2(piM − 2piD).(9)
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piM − 2piD > 0 because a monopolist can replicate two duopolists. Because
of symmetry the arguments hold for firm 2, too. Thus, N(p˜i) > N(pi) for
i = 1, 2. 2
The more interesting cases arise when Π1(S;L) > Π1(L;L) and Π1(L;L) >
Π1(S;S) > 0 and the same holds for firm 2. This means that both firms pre-
fer to be the only firm employing the S strategy but they are worse-off than
under the L;L strategy if both choose S. This is a prisoners’ dilemma. Given
the L;L situation each firm has an incentive to unilaterally switch to S, but
they will end up in the S;S case. S;S is a Nash-equilibrium with none of the
firms having an incentive to unilaterally switch to the L strategy. Formally,
the prisoners’ dilemma arises if
Π1(S, L) > Π1(L,L)(10)
Π1(L,L) > Π1(S, S)(11)
Π1(S, S) > Π1(L, S)(12)
and the analogous conditions hold for i = 2. I can show
Lemma 2 Given that the firms are symmetric and that (p, p) is the sym-
metric Nash equilibrium for (i ∈ {1, 2}, Ni ∈ [0;∞[,Π(Ni, N−i)). Then a
prisoners’ dilemma will arise if
N(p) ∈ [(p− p2)(piM − 2piD); (p− p2)(piM − 2piD) + p2piD](13)
where p1 = p2 ≡ p because of symmetry.
Proof We show that (10) through (12) is met. Because of symmetry it is
sufficient to show that the conditions hold for one firm.
14
(11) holds if
piD > −N(p1) + p1(1− p2)piM + [(1− p1)(1− p2) + p1p2]piD(14)
Using the symmetry p1 = p2 ≡ p results in
N(p1) > (p− p2)(piM − 2piD)(15)
which constitutes the lower bound in (13).
(10) holds for
−N(p˜1) + p˜1piM + (1− p˜1)piD > piD(16)
which is equivalent to
N(p˜1) < p˜1(pi
M − piD).(17)
Applying the symmetry condition to (12)
−N(p1) + p1(1− p2)piM + (1− p)piD + p1p2piD > (1− p2)piD(18)
yields
N(p1) < (p− p2)(piM − piD) + p2piD.(19)
Note that firm 1 faces p2 if he unilaterally chooses N(p1) because firm 2
would still expect to be in the S;S situation.
15
Now I show that (19) implies (17). Insert p˜1 = p in (17)
LHS ≡ N(p) < p(piM − piD) ≡ RHS(20)
and compare with (19) rearranged as follows
N(p) < p(piM − piD)− p2(piM − 2piD).(21)
(20) implies (21). For p˜1 > p the incremental change in (20) is∫ p˜1
p
N(x)dx < (p˜1 − p)(piM − piD)(22)
and the inequality holds because of (7) and convexity of N . Because (17) is
weaker condition than (19) for p˜1 = p and (17) is further weakened for p˜1 > p
conditions (15) and (19) define lemma (2). 2
Existence of an Equilibrium
Note that an equilibrium (p, p) where p > 0 not necessarily exists. Since we
add no additional restriction on N(·) except strict convexity, it is possible
that N ′(0) > 0 exceeds the expected revenue from the first patent and thus,
firms choose not to patent, N = 0.
2.2 Equilibria in the dynamic game
Lemma 2 holds for a one-shot game with the payoff matrix given by Table
1. In a dynamic setting where the game is repeated perpetually, I need
further assumptions on the firms’ expectations. Unless otherwise stated, I will
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assume that firms expect that their competitor is sticking to his/her strategy
unless they have a unilateral incentive to change. For a prisoners’ dilemma
the firms must be better-off under L;L than under S;S, thus condition (11)
must hold. Further, departing from L;L each firm has an incentive to choose
S, and departing from S;L (L;S) firm 2 (1) has an incentive to match S. In
the dynamic game the firms anticipate that unilaterally deviating from L;L
will result in S;L for one period and S;S for all future periods because none
of he firms will have an incentive to return to L unilaterally. When deviating
from L;L a firm will have to value a short term benefit of Π1(S, L) followed
by an eternal flow of Π1(S, S) compared with a permanent profit Π1(L,L).
Formally, the condition is
Π(S, L) +
δ
1− δΠ(S, S) >
1
1− δΠ(L,L).(23)
This is equivalent to
δ <
Π(S, L)− Π(L,L)
Π(S, L)− Π(S, S) ≡ δ(24)
Lemma 3 There exists δ such that a firm chooses S for δ < δ and L other-
wise.
Proof From the assumption Π(S, L) > Π(L,L) > Π(S, S) > Π(L, S) > 0
follows immediately 0 < δ < 1. 2
The prisoners’ dilemma can arise for δ < δ and the situation converges to
the static setting for δ → 0.
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2.3 Unilateral enforcement
In this section, I analyze a firm’s incentive to commit to a certain level of
patent applications in order to deter other firms from deviating from the L;L
situation. In the previous sections, I have considered Nash equilibria only. If
a prisoners’ dilemma arises, both firms prefer L;L to S;S but no firm has an
incentive to unilaterally switch to L. Further, in an L;L situation, each of
the firms would have an incentive to switch to S. Now, I discuss the strategy
of a firm which can commit to a certain level of patent applications. For
simplicity, I assume that firm 2 can commit to p2 in a credible way and firm
1 will observe and react upon p2. The same arguments hold for firm 1 in an
analogous way. Given the situation L;L I analyze whether firm 2 is capable
and has an incentive to choose another number of patent applications than in
the Nash Equilibrium. In this scenario, first firm 2 sets p2 and, subsequently,
firm 1 chooses L or S and p1.
In the situation with the prisoner’s dilemma
Π(S, L) > Π(L,L) > Π(S, S) > Π(L, S)
holds true. In order to prevent firm 1’s deviating from L;L the first inequality
must be inverted such that
Π(S, L) ≤ Π(L,L).
Clearly, in the static setting where the game ends after one period, there is
no way to prevent the prisoners’ dilemma. A commitment to p2 consists of
firm s’s commitment to set p2 in the S;S situation which would occur once
one firm chooses S. If the game ends after the first period or δ = 0 the threat
of setting p2 in a subsequent period is ineffective.
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I can show for the dynamic game
Lemma 4 There exists δ(p2) < 1 such that a firm with δ > δ(p2) stays with
the long research cycle L. Further, for δ ∈ [δ; δ] firm 2 can enforce L;L by
setting p2 ∈ [p∗2; 1],
where δ is defined in (24) and
δ =
−N(p˜1) + p1(piM − piD)
−N(p˜1) + p1(piM − piD) +N(p1) + (1− p1)piD = δ(p2 = 1).
Proof Firm 2 does not choose S if
−N(p˜1) + p˜1piM + (1− p˜1)piD
+
δ
1− δ
(−N(p1) + p1(1− p2)piM + (1− p1)(1− p2)piD + p1p2piD)
≤ 1
1− δpi
D.
or
δ ≥
−N(p˜1) + p1(piM − piD)
−N(p˜1) + p˜1piM + (1− p1)piD − (−N(p1) + p1(1− p2)piM + ((1− p1)(1− p2) + p1p2)piD)
≡ δ(p2).
If p∗2 is the Nash-equilibrium S;S, then
δ(p∗2) =
Π(S, L)− Π(L,L)
Π(S, L)− Π(S, S) ≡ δ(25)
and inserting p2 = 1 yields
−N(p˜1) + p1(piM − piD)
−N(p˜1)(piM − piD) +N(p1) + (1− p1)piD ≡ δ(26)
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which proves the lemma. 2
Note that p1 is a function of p2 because it is the best response of firm 1
with respect to p2. This lemma does not state that firm 2 can always enforce
an L;L equilibrium. For δ < δ(1) this will not be possible and the lower is
δ, the more patents firm 2 must apply for and, thus, the higher the cost that
she must incur in order to ensure the L;L outcome.
p2 = 1 provides the least incentive for firm 1 to choose S because he
would never obtain the monopoly profit after the first period. However, this
implies N(p2) =∞. Thus, firm 2 is only willing to deter if it can do so with
fewer patent applications and a lower probability p2 < 1.
The deterministic interpretation requires that both firms have common
knowledge about the parameters. If firm 2 has only information about the
distribution of firm 1’s parameters, she can form expectations about the
effect of her number of patent applications on the probability of deterring
firm 1. Then the marginal cost of an increase in firm 2’s success probability
must be compared to the marginal benefit from a reduced probability of firm
1 choosing S. This interpretation is valid under the assumption that the
commitment to a constant number of patent applications N(p2) over time
is binding. Clearly, after realizing that N(p2) is not high enough to deter 1
from S firm 2 may want to revise its decision. This would imply an updating
of firm 2’s priors on 1.
The scenario for deterring bilateral intensive R&D relies on the assump-
tion that firm 2 can commit to more intensive R&D by herself as a retaliation
strategy. The deterrence stage does not occur and no additional effort be-
comes necessary and no additional cost is incurred by firm 2. Thus, a credible
commitment may be hard to realize.
20
In the case, when the firms are already stuck in the prisoners’ dilemma
S;S, they would prefer to return to the L;L situation because this is more
beneficial to both of them. We demonstrate that there is no 0 < p2 ≤ 1 such
that firm 1 prefers L to S in the one shot static game.
Lemma 5 In the one shot game or δ = 0 firm 2 cannot commit to a level
p2 such that firm 1 prefers to choose L instead of S in the Nash equilibrium
S;S.
Proof The asserted incentive is defined by
LHS ≡
(1− p2)piD > −N(p1) + p1(1− p2)piM + [(1− p1)(1− p2) + p1p2]piD
≡ RHS.
For p2 = 0 I have Π(L;L) ≡ piD < −N(p1) + p1piM + (1 − p1)piD = Π(S;L)
which holds by assumption in the prisoners’ dilemma because i = 1 sets
p1 = p
L
1 . For p2 = 1 LHS = 0 < −N(p1) + p1piD = RHS. These limit values
combined with
∂RHS
∂p2
= −p1(piM − 2piD)− piD < −piD = ∂LHS
∂p2
,
where I apply the envelope theorem to RHS (p1(p2); p2), imply LHS <
RHS ∀ p2. Thus, for p2 ∈ [0; 1] the assertion cannot hold. 2
In the dynamic setting, firm 2 can generate an incentive for firm 1 to
switch and stick to strategy L by the appropriate threat of setting N(p2).
The transition from S;S to L;L requires a commitment by firm 2. If this
commitment is credible it becomes effective immediately and Lemma (4) is
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relevant.
3 Discussion
This basic model shows that several situations may occur depending on the
specifics of the market. If patenting costs are high or if firms can react only
slowly such that remote periods are significantly discounted, firms tend to
stick to the long R&D cycle. This is in line with the observation in the
automobile industry where before the introduction of computerized devel-
opment, like computer aided design or crash test simulations, model cycles
were longer than they are nowadays. By now, none of the major producers
of automobiles did abstain from this technological progress.
Once the firms have adopted the higher patenting rate and shorter prod-
uct cycles, they have no unilateral incentive to adopt the longer product cy-
cle. This effect is not driven by demand because we neglect putative changes
in customer preferences. Rather the high patenting frequency of a firm’s
competitor would drive her out of the market if she does not mimic the S
strategy.
Further, I have identified unilateral strategies that enforce a long cycle
strategy. Such a strategy is only possible in a repeated setting where a com-
mitment mechanism is available. This reflects the situation in typical product
markets like, inter alia, automobile, household appliances, or computers. The
static model is a reference case, but it can serve to understand emerging mar-
kets. In the software industry programming is realized in 24-hour-working
days.14 Test versions and beta versions are launched in order to shorten the
development time until marketing of new products. Here, firms face poten-
14See Kobitzsch et al. 2001.
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tial competition from innovators with similar products which are not yet in
the market. Significant network effects, which are driven by consumer pref-
erences, provide an incentive to introduce new products as early as possible
because any lag behind a competitor may be fatal.
In the reference case all firms are identical. In the extension where one
firm can commit to a particular number of patent applications I give up the
symmetry assumption. This can refer to a case where a firm is acquired
by another company with a more rigorous patenting strategy. We observe
that some firms are very active in patenting where others are not. Texas
Instruments, Lucent or IBM for example apply for many more patents than
firms in the same product market and they are more brisk in defending their
patent rights in litigation (Thomas (2001)).
The prisoners’ dilemma is one potential Nash equilibrium. It can occur
for some parameter ranges and I provided arguments that in some example
industries this equilibrium may not have occurred if none of the active firms
had launched the short R&D cycle. In the following we extend the reference
model.
4 Extensions
4.1 Network Effects
Network effects are driven by market demand because the consumers’ utility
increases increases with the number of consumers of the same product. Katz
and Shapiro (1985) show in a one-period strategic game that the consumers’
expectations about which product will be dominant can determine which
product actually will be successful. In the context of infinitely many discrete
periods Ofek and Sarvary (2003) introduce an exogenous reputation effect
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which is not based on the technology or the R&D productivity and that
gives the incumbent firm an advantage over its competitors. The reputation
advantage has similar effect as the network effect as I model it here because an
incumbent benefits from being active on the market before the competitors.
In their model, an intermediate or high reputation effect raises the success
probability in the subsequent period. This reduces the R&D investment
productivity and thus the incumbent firm spends less effort the the greater
the reputation advantage. Similarly, Dasgupta (1986) shows that success in
R&D leads to a higher success rate in subsequent periods. The present model
comprises this ”success breeds success”effect in the sense that both firms may
be successful in the R&D activities, but having had success in the previous
period gives that firm an additional advantage.
I modify the basic model in order to cover this effect. Assume that the
firms have identical products but one has launched her product before the
other. Then the first product will face more demand because consumers ex-
pect that other consumers choose this product, too. For simplicity, I assume
that the earlier product continues to earn monopoly profit when firms offer
identical products. This is the case if firm i was successful in time t − 1
and the other was not, and in time t both firms have no success in the R&D
activities and they are forced to cell their old products. This means that
when both firms are not successful in their R&D they will continue to earn
the same profit as they did in the previous period. If at least one firm is
successful the payoffs remain the same as in the reference model: If exactly
one of the firms is successful it will earn monopoly profit and if both are
successful both earn duopoly profit.
These changes require a modification of the payoff structure because the
payoff in one period depends on the success or failure in the previous period.
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Thus, I can reformulate the condition for firm 1 to switch to S:
Π˜(S;L) +
δ
1− δ Π˜(S;S) >
1
1− δΠ(L;L)(27)
and I can show
Lemma 6 (i) Compared to the reference model, the presence of network ef-
fects raises the number of patent applications in the first short R&D cycle.
(ii) The number of patent applications tends to fall in subsequent periods
when all firms opt for the short R&D cycle. (iii) When both firms opt for the
short R&D cycle the incentive to patent is higher than absent network effects
if firms earn duopoly profits in the preceding period.
Proof We change notation in for this subsection such that the superscript
t denotes the time period where 0 is the stage in which firm 1 may switch to
S. The payoffs in the first four periods are
Π˜0(S;L) = −N(p01) + p01piM + (1− p01)piD(28)
Π˜1(S;S)
δ
= −N(p11) + p11(1− p12)piM + p11p12piD(29)
+δ(1− p11)(1− p12)
[
p01pi
M + (1− p1)0piD
]
Π˜2(S;S)
δ2
= −N(p21) + p21(1− p22)piM + p21p22piD(30)
+δ(1− p21)(1− p22)
[
p11(1− p12)piM + (1− p11)(1− p12)piD + p11p11piD
]
Π˜3(S;S)
δ3
= −N(p31) + p31(1− p32)piM + p31p32piD(31)
+δ(1− p31)(1− p32)
[
p21(1− p22)piM + (1− p21)(1− p22)piD + p21p21piD
]
The first order condition with respect to p01 in the period t = 0 is
N ′(p01) = (pi
M − piD) + δ(1− p11)(1− p12)(piM − piD).(32)
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We immediately see that p01 exceeds p1 in the first order condition absent
network effects N ′(p1) = piM − piD. This proves part (i).
In the periods t ≥ 1 the firms’ incentive to apply for patents depends on
the outcome of the previous period. Since both firms apply the short R&D
cycle, patenting becomes less productive for firm 1 in expectations because
if firm 2 is successful, firm 1 earns duopoly profit at best. The presence of
a patenting competitor reduces the incentive to apply for patents after the
first period (ii).
If a firm earns duopoly profit in a period t− 1 the marginal revenue from
patenting is equal to the incentive absent network effects plus the expected
payoff in t+ 1. Thus the incentive is higher than absent the network effects
(iii). If a firm earns monopoly profit in a period t−1 the marginal revenue in
t from patenting is lower than the incentive absent network effects because
if both firms are not successful, this firm still earns monopoly profit. This
diminished incentive may be compensated by the incentive to obtain an ex-
pected payoff in t+ 1 but which effect dominates is not clear. 2
For each firm there are three different states: monopoly, duopoly, or zero
profit. Therefore, the exact incentive for a firm to patent depends on the
outcome of the previous period. This will determine the incentive to patent
in the current period because it is sensible to assume that firms observe
each other’s number of patent applications prior to choose their own action.
Further, it remains unclear whether in the long run, more patents are filed
under the presence of network effects than without but there is an intuitive
argument in favor of a higher level of patenting: Network effects render the
monopoly position more attractive because this position may be preserved
throughout the following period. While the monopolist has a lower incen-
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tive to patent because of the Arrow-effect,15 the competitor has an increased
incentive to avoid the zero profit situation in the subsequent period. Thus,
monopoly profit tends to occur more often when network effects are present
because even with two successful firms only the one with success in the pre-
vious period will earn monopoly profits. Since piM > 2piD the market value
is raised and this overall raises the incentive to compete for the market by
investing more in R&D and applying for more patents.
Besides the effect on the patent propensity, we observe similar effects to
the innovative advantage and the reputation advantage in Ofek and Sarvary
(2003). In their model the reputation effect decreases the firms’ incentive to
invest in R&D. The substitution effect reduces the incumbent’s incentive to
innovate. But the higher R&D productivity may still result in a higher R&D
effort, unless the innovative advantage becomes so important such that the
laggard cannot catch up and this would mitigate the leaders R&D incentive.
Similarly, the network effect in the present model leads to the effect that the
technology leader has less incentive to invest.
4.2 Blocking Patents
Blocking patents are one aspect of patent thickets. Letting aside uncertainty
and the holdup problem, I focus on the patent thicket as an overlapping
set of patent rights. In order to commercialize a product a company must
disentangle a web of intellectual property rights; this situation can cause the
detrimental effect of discouraging innovation.16 The existence of overlapping
intellectual property rights results in an inevitable infringement of external
patents when fully taking advantage of the own patent’s scope. Avoiding
litigations or a holdup requires that the own patent cannot be exploited to
15See Tirole(1988).
16See Shapiro (2001).
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the entire extent. Therefore, some patents my lie idle after a firm has invested
R&D effort for this patent.
We introduce this effect in our model by awarding each patent a supple-
mental blocking effect on the competitor’s patents. Again, I will concentrate
on the incentives for one firm, understanding that the effects for the other is
symmetric. Patent applications N(pi) by firm i will block patents by firm j
with probability βpi where β ∈ [0; 1]. This means that j’s success probability
is reduced by the factor βpi and only the share (1 − βpi)pj is the effective
success probability of firm 2.
The cases L;L and S;L remain unaltered compared to the reference model
because firm 2 has no patent applications which, by assumption, may interfere
with firm 1’s patent applications.
no blocking (A) i = 1 blocking (B) i = 1, 2 blocking (C)
probability payoff probability payoff probability payoff
(a) p1(1− p2) piM βp2 piD
(1− βp2) piM
(b) (1− p1)(1− p2) piD
(c1) p1p2 pi
D βp1 pi
M βp2 pi
D
(1− βp2 piM
(c2) (1− βp1) piD (1− β)p2 piD
βp2 0
(d) (1− p1)p2 0 βp1 piD
(1− βp1) 0
Table 2: Payoff for i = 1 with Blocking Patents
Table 2 shows for the S;S situation the payoffs and the respective prob-
abilities of firm 1 absent blocking patents L;L, only 1 blocking S;L, and
1 and 2 blocking S;S, in columns A, B, and C, respectively. (A) is the
situation where there are not conflicting intellectual property rights. Col-
umn (B) indicates the effect of firm 1’s patent applications on the expected
28
payoffs. These patents can neutralize firm 2’s patents and, thus, transform-
ing a duopoly profit into a monopoly profit or a zero profit into a duopoly.
Column (C) adds the effect of firm 2’s patent applications which potentially
block firm 1’s patents.
Rewriting the payoff absent blocking patents
Π(S, S) =
−N(p1) + p1︸︷︷︸(1− p2)piM + (1− p1)(1− p2)piD + p1p2︸︷︷︸ piD + (1− p1) p2︸︷︷︸ 0
allows to mark the successful R&D activities that may be subject to conflict-
ing applications by the competitor. We add the last term equal to zero for
illustrative purpose only because introducing the blocking effect may render
it positive with some probability. This payoff function is amended by the
situations where one or both firms are blocking their competitor’s patents.
Then the payoff is
Π˜(S;S) = −N(p1) + p1(1− p2)
[
βp2pi
D + (1− β)piM]+ (1− p1)(1− p2)piD
+p1p2
[
βp1(βp2piD + (1− βp2)piM) + (1− βp1)(1− βp2)piD
]
+(1− p1)p2βp1piD
which simplifies to
Π˜(S;S) = −N(p1) + Π(S;S)
−βp1p2
[
(1− p1 − p2 + p1p2β)(piM − 2piD)
]
(33)
where Π(S;S) = p1(1− p2)piM + (1− p1)(1− p2)piD + p1p2piD is the profit of
the reference model wheref both firms choose the short R&D cycle.
Proposition 1 The effect of blocking patents (i) on the number of patent
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applications is negative, (ii) on overall profit is negative if 2p − βp2 < 1
and positive otherwise, (iii) on consumer surplus and the probability of a
prisoners’ dilemma is inverse to (ii). Thereby p = p1 = p2 is the symmetric
equilibrium of the game (i ∈ {1, 2}, Ni ∈ [0;∞[, Π˜(Ni, N−i)).
Proof For (i) assume that p2 > p
O
2 where p
O ≡ pO2 = pO1 is the equilibrium
of the benchmark game in Lemma 2 absent blocking effects. The first order
condition of (33) for firm 1 is
N ′(p1) = piM − piD − p2(piM − 2piD)− βp2(piM − 2piD) [1− 2p1 − p2 + βp2p2]
≡MR.(34)
The right hand side denotes 1’s marginal revenue. Then,
∂MR
∂p2
= −(piM − piD)− β(piM − 2piD)(1− 2p2) + p12β(piM − 2piD)(1− 2βp2)
= (piM − 2piD) [−1− β(−1 + 2p2 + 2p1 − 4p1p2)] < 0(35)
for p ≡ p1 = p2 (symmetry) and any 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. For p2 > pO we have
N ′(p1) = MR′ < MR and, thus, p1 < pO. Because of symmetry p1 = p2
which contradicts the assertion p2 > p
O.
For (ii), recall that firm i’s number of patent applications is determined by
the first order condition of (33) with respect to pi which is ∂Π˜(S;S)/∂pi = 0.
For β = 0 (33) is equivalent to (6). Applying the envelope theorem on
∂Π˜(p1(β), β)
∂β
=
∂Π˜
∂p1
∂p1
∂β
+
∂Π˜
∂β
(36)
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simplifies to
dΠ˜
dβ
= −p1p2 [1− p1 − p2 + βp1p2] (piM − 2piD) < 0.(37)
which holds in a symmetric equilibria p1 = p2 ≡ p for 2p− βp2 < 1.
For (iii) note that there are only two states for the provision, namely
duopoly and monopoly. A lower expected payoff implies that duopoly be-
comes more probable. Thus welfare increases and lowers the probability of a
prisoners’ dilemma because Π˜(S;S) in (24) decreases. 2
The blocking effect of patents decreases the productivity of R&D because
the blocking effect increases the probability that an application becomes obso-
lete. This effect reduces the number of patent applications of the competitor.
However, this latter effect is dominated by the productivity effect. Clark and
Konrad (2006) find this effect in a model of a contest where a marketable
product builds on multiple, complementary patents. They predict that R&D
effort is reduced in the light of upcoming hold-up situations.
The effect of the blocking property on the firms’ overall expected profit
is ambiguous. For small numbers of patent applications, p < 1/2, amplify-
ing the blocking effect will always reduce the firms’ profit, i.e. a duopoly
becomes more probable because this will preempt the competitor to achieve
a marketable innovation. An aggravation of the blocking effect when firms
apply for many patents will raise the probability of monopoly profits because
one competitor is more likely to be blocked.
Overall profits and welfare perform in an idiosyncratic way because we
assume that duopoly with new and old products generate the same profits
and welfare. This is a strong assumption because an indefinite duopoly with
outdated products would generate the same welfare as an incessant product
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improvement. Raising prices and costs may attenuate this objection. Ac-
tually, in some markets we observe significant price escalations, for example
in the automobile industry, whereas other industries like semiconductors we
observe quality improvements but approximately constant prices for PCs.
The implications for the probability of a prisoners’ dilemma is technically
based on the magnitude of the expected firms’ profit in the S;S situation.
Changes in Π˜(S;S) make it more or less attractive to leave the L;L situation.
Thus, a policy that ensures that a pure duopoly arises under the S;S schedule
makes it less attractive to deviate from an L;L situation.
Mutually blocking patents create an incentive to licensing in order to make
the blocked technologies accessible. Licensing helps solving patent thickets
when all parties agree not to litigate against potential infringement. There
are two types of licensing, ex ante licensing and ex post licensing, which differ
by the timing of the licensing agreement relative to the timing of the R&D
investment. For the semi-conductor industry Siebert and von Graevenitz
(2006) find that most agreements involve ex ante licensing. But there is also
evidence for ex post licensing, i.e. agreements after the parties have built up
patent stocks which have mutually blocking effects (Lerner and Tirole (2004),
Ziedonis (2004)).
Introducing ex ante licensing in the present model setting means that a
firm could not gain an advantage over her competitor and thus, has no incen-
tive to file a costly patent application. Thus, an ex ante licensing agreement
would stabilize long research cycles with low R&D incentives. This gives
rise to antitrust issues because such an agreement may be considered anti-
competitive. Lerner and Tirole (2004) focus on this discussion and provides
conditions under which a patent pool is efficiency enhancing. This is even
more the case if patents are complementary assets. We see that transforming
R&D effort into a public good immediately paralyzes R&D. An evaluation
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of ex ante licensing requires a richer modeling of demand in order to assess
the welfare effect of reduced innovative activities.
Under ex post licensing negotiations take place after firms have set up
their patent portfolios. In the present model, this can be interpreted as
incorporating technologies which would have lied idle otherwise. This is
welfare enhancing in the most cases. Still antitrust issues may arise when
cross licensing has a potential to enforce higher marginal cost and higher than
competitive prices on the product market. The U.S. Antitrust Guidelines of
the Licensing of Intellectual Property aim at preventing such behavior.17
Besides antitrust issues, ex post licensing can also distort R&D incentives.
Anticipating hold-up situation may be an additional motive for patenting,
in particular in industries which tend to build up patent thickets (Ziedonis
(2004)). An R&D strategy that aims at creating pure complementarities in
order to secure a share in the competitor’s achievement or in order to ob-
tain a better position in subsequent negotiations may induce socially wasteful
effort. Therefore, going for blocking patents instead of differentiating tech-
nologies constitutes an insurance against being blocked oneself, even if the
blocking patent does not contribute to one own’s technology. Even absent
blocking effects of patents Gerlach et al. (2004) analyze the R&D incentives
to go for mainstream or niche products where R&D success is uncertain.
They find that firms tend to aim more at mainstream products than socially
desirable. Similarly, Cardon and Sasaki (1998) find that R&D tend to cumu-
late on single technologies more than socially desirable instead of aiming at
differentiated markets.
17http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm
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5 Conclusion
The analysis has shown that shorter product cycles can induce more patent-
ing activities. This provides a counter argument to the intuitive reaction of
patenting less when the time is shortened during which the R&D investment
must be recouped or a secret idea may be discovered and replicated. The
underlying mechanism for the more intensive patenting activity is that one
firm may start to patent for exogenous reasons and the optimal reaction of
other firms is then to match this behavior. Otherwise, the extensive patent-
ing of one firm would drive the other firms out of the market or cut their
profits significantly. In order to prevent this, the other firms will file patent
applications on ideas which may not be mature yet. If this situation occurs
the firms may end up in a prisoners’ dilemma where they would jointly prefer
the situation where all firms innovate at moderate pace but each individual
firm has an incentive to deviate to a short cycle with intensive patenting.
Further, network effects may reinforce a firm’s incentive to accelerate
her R&D process and to induce other firms to adopt this strategy. Network
effects make it more attractive to gain market shares at an early stage because
an advance compared to the competitors will be persistent. Therefore, the
model predicts an intensive race by means of patent applications followed by
a period of weakened innovative activities.
Similarly, blocking patents provide an advantage over competitors by lim-
iting their access to technologies. But, in contrast to network effects, this is
socially harmful because some R&D effort is wasted. Therefore, firms will
patent less because their R&D tends to be less efficient. Also, a monopoly
position becomes less probable if the blocking effect is strong.
Welfare implications are restricted to the pace of technological develop-
ment because the modeling of demand behavior limits further interpretation
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of consumer welfare. There is an immediate welfare loss from the block-
ing effect which inhibits patented technologies from being incorporated in
marketed products. Moreover, over time patents and patent applications
accumulate and the delayed publication 18 months after first filing creates
uncertainty. This may create a patent thicket. Once this occurs, this may de-
ter active firms from further research or potential entrants from engaging in
this technology. The uncertainty is even increased when firms apply through
the WIPO where an applicant can delay its decision to seek for protection for
up to 18 further months compared to the procedure through national patent
offices.
In the present model we do not tackle the question about the optimal
amount of innovation. Usually, it is assumed that more innovation is better
than less. Then a policy which promotes more innovation is beneficial. On
the level of the patent examination process a blocking patent cannot be
identified because the blocking property becomes relevant when the patent
technology is used in a product. Therefore, licensing as an instrument to
solve up blocking effects should be facilitated. This holds in particular for
technology areas where patent thickets emerge.
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